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Abstract
We present an evolutionary growth model where the degree of gender equality
evolves towards the value maximising social output. It follows that a woman’s bar-
gaining power should depend positively on her relative productivity. When an economy
is less developed, physical strength plays a key role in production and thus, total out-
put is greater when the man gets a larger share. As society develops and accumulates
physical capital and human capital, the woman becomes relatively more productive,
which drives the output maximising social norm towards gender equality. Empirical
results support these predictions of the theoretical model. Simulations show that in
the long run, an economy with gender equality can outperform an economy where
gender balance of power maximises social output, although in the short run, it can lag
behind.
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1 Introduction
Gender balance of power in a society is regulated by many institutions such as religious tra-
ditions, legal systems and social norms. These institutions do not only vary across countries
but also evolve over time. Our paper proposes a growth model explaining the evolution of
gender equality. We use a popular assumption that social institutions evolve towards the
largest probability of survival. This idea was formulated by behavioural biologists (Hamilton
1964, Levin and Kimer, 1974) and has been accepted and developed by economists (Frank,
1998; Bergstrom, 1995; Alger and Weibull, 2010, 2012). Ceteris paribus, a society which
produces a larger economic output can afford a stronger defence and will survive in a hostile
environment with greater probability. Its institutions are also more attractive for imitation
by other communities. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that social norms evolve to-
wards those which maximise social output. We apply this concept to explain the evolution
of gender balance of power.
There is a large empirical literature on the progress of women’s position in society. Giu-
liano (2017) reviews the evidence related to labour force participation, fertility, education,
marriage law, intolerance to domestic violence etc., which indicates that women’s position
within the family, in the workplace and in society has been rising. There is a significant
decrease in the gender wage gap (Blau, 1998; Edin and Richardson, 2002; Goldin, 2006;
Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008; Heathcote et al., 2010 ; Siegel, 2014). The legal rights of
women have improved, including inheritance rights and divorce conditions (Geddes and
Lueck, 2002; Doepke and Tertilt, 2009; Fernandez, 2014). There is a positive trend in
women’s participation in the formal labour market (Fernandez, 2013) and in the number of
women and their influence in political leadership positions (Alesina et al., 2013). Figure 1
shows the recent trend in the ratio of female to male labour force participation for selected
countries according to the World Bank data.
Figure 1. Labour force participation Female/Male
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It is interesting to look at the factors which promote gender equality. Basu (2006), Rainer
(2008) and Iyigun and Walsh (2007) assume that a woman’s bargaining power depends on
the relative amount of income she contributes to the household. Similarly, De la Croix and
Vander Donckt (2010) also postulate that the bargaining power depends on the earning
abilities of the spouses. We provide a theoretical explanation for this assumption. In our
model the social institutions define gender power. We adopt the idea that the institutional
design develops towards a maximisation of social output. This increases the strength and
stability of the social institution and also promotes the external cultural influence. We prove
that if the social norms are designed in a way that maximises social output, the bargaining
power of the woman should be proportional to her share of the family production. Therefore,
we justify the assumptions of Iyigun and Walsh (2007) and De la Croix and Vander Donckt
(2010) about the endogeneity of gender bargaining power. In our paper, female bargaining
power is a proxy for social norms and institutional design. The evolution of the divorce law
or an increasing social intolerance of domestic violence are examples of such social norms.
There are several theoretical models explaining the evolution of women’s rights and
labour force participation. According to Fernandez (2014), women’s liberalisation is facil-
itated by men being willing to grant more rights to their daughters. Doepke and Tertilt
(2009) show how women’s rights increase with higher returns to education and a wife’s
exclusive ability to educate children. Geddes and Lueck (2002) exploit the relationship be-
tween women’s rights and their incentives to invest in productive effort and human capital
accumulation. They investigate the male’s choice between two institutions: the patriarch
regime, when only man’s utility is maximised, and the equal rights regime. Our model al-
lows for a continuous spectrum of women’s rights in society measured as women’s bargaining
power over social income. In modelling the endogeneity of gender power, our paper com-
plements Echevarria and Merlo (1999), where parents make decisions about the educational
investment in their sons and daughters to maximise the total utility of the family, given the
institutional design with endogenous gender power.
Our paper aims at providing an alternative explanation for the evolution of gender
equality. As many other papers, we relate it to economic growth and structural change
in the production technology. The originality is in our assumption that gender power is
determined by social norms which evolve towards a maximisation of social output. The
social norms, in turn, have an impact on the productive efforts of men and women. When
the economy is at its early stage, the physical strength plays a key role in production and
therefore the man is more effi cient. Hence, it is socially beneficial to give him a larger share
of the household product. However, as the economy develops and accumulates physical and
human capital, the relative productivity of women increases and so should the share of their
reward.
The production process in our model consists of three sectors: natural resources extrac-
tion, manufacturing using physical capital, and service which is human capital intensive.
Man’s relative productivity is very high in resource extraction but it declines as physical
capital accumulates. We assume that a woman’s productivity in the human capital intensive
sector is not less than that of a man. The human capital/service sector relies on intellect and
creativity. This sector includes child rearing, because this activity is creative in its nature,
requiring high intensive human capital. The level and composition of the three production
sectors change over time. In the early days of civilization, male physical strength was very
important in resource extraction. As technology improves, the relative productivity of men
declines, which evolves the social institutions towards increasing women’s bargaining power
to incentivise women’s efforts and contributions. As women have a relative advantage in
the human capital intensive sector, their empowerment encourages an acceleration in the
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accumulation of human capital. This, in turn, improves total productivity and generates
further structural changes in production technology favourable to women. We show that
as long as human capital productivity is the same for both men and women, the gender
balance of power will eventually converge to equality.
Our theoretical model is consistent with the empirical literature on the factors explaining
gender inequality. According to Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) and Heathcote et al. (2010),
a decrease in the wage gap should be attributed to the higher return to investment in
human capital and also to the drift in technology towards those sectors where women have
comparative advantages. Kury et al. (2004) compare domestic violence across Europe and
find that the variation is explained by economic conditions. Rendall (2013, 2015) shows
that the structural changes in the labour market, requiring less brawn and more service
oriented skills, decrease the gender gap in labour market participation. Alesina et al. (2013)
find that a male’s relative productivity in the pre-industrial period explains the variation in
gender inequality today. Our model is similar in spirit to Galor and Weil (1996), who show
that capital accumulation increases women’s productivity, narrowing gender pay gap.
The inclusion of natural resources in total production is an important facet of our model
which allows for an alternative explanation of the "curse of natural resources", reviewed
by Sachs and Warner (2001) and Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007). Our model predicts that
an economy with larger natural resource endowments will not only grow at a lower rate
but also experience higher gender inequality, which reduces the speed of human capital
accumulation. A larger natural resource sector causes a larger relative male productivity as
in the pre-industrial time. Indeed, Alesina et al. (2013) report strong empirical evidence
that a "plough positive" community, where physical strength was extremely important as a
production factor, has norms which are less gender equal. Our model provides a theoretical
support for that relation.
A higher share of the natural resources sector reduces the relative productivity of women,
which would not only result in higher gender inequality, but also a lower investment in
human capital by both men and women. On the other hand, our model predicts that a
larger share of human capital in the production process implies a social evolution towards
gender equality. This is consistent with the empirical data. According to the UN Human
Development Report, the Gender Inequality Index (GII) has a positive correlation with the
share of natural resources in GDP across countries (Figure 2) but has a negative correlation
with the expected years of schooling. (Figure 3).
With the accumulation of human capital, the optimum gender balance of power evolves
towards equality. However, there could be a time lag in adopting the gender balance of
power which maximises social output. We show that a faster adaptation of the optimum
level would lead to higher economic growth. We explore the case when an economy adopts
gender equality prematurely. Our simulations provide some interesting and useful insights.
In the short run, an economy with gender equality can lag behind an economy where the
gender balance of power maximises the social output. Gender equality is less beneficial in
terms of current social output in an economy which is less developed. Premature gender
equality may slow down economic growth. However, it promotes investment in human capital
and the speed of human capital accumulation. Consequently, in the long run, a gender
equal economy can outperform an economy which maximises current output. Therefore,
gender equality induces a faster accumulation of human capital which is beneficial for future
generations and propel the economy forward.
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Figure 2. GII and Natural resources
Figure 3. GII and Education
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present a static economic
environment with a representative household comprising a man and a woman. For the
given level of development, we compute the gender balance of power which would have
been the best for that particular generation. Here we prove that gender equality increases
with relative women’s productivity. In Section 3, we use a traditional economic growth
framework for the accumulation of both physical and human capital. Further, we add an
adaptive motion for social norms, assuming that they evolve towards the optimal value for
society. This section presents the main results related to a positive correlation between
economic development and gender equality. It also contributes to the explanation for the
curse of the natural resources. In Section 4, we perform an empirical analysis to strengthen
the theoretical findings. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 One Generation Economy
We investigate a representative household composed of a man and a woman contributing
to the household’s total production. Throughout the model, superscript j = m,w denotes






where Y j is the production output of j, which increases concavely with effort ej. The term
Aj captures some parameters which influence the productivity, where β < 1 is the effort
elasticity of production. The joint family income of the household is given by Y,
Y = Y m + Y w. (2)
Following Chiappori (1988), we assume that the woman and man receive different shares
of the family output, which is an outcome of the Nash bargaining process, where fw and
fm correspond to the bargaining powers of w and m, respectively.1 As a result of Nash
bargaining, each agent j receives a proportion f j ∈ [0, 1] of the total household production
for consumption, Cj, where fw + fm = 1. This proportion is determined by the bargaining
power of w and m which is generally accepted as the social norm
Cj = f jY. (3)
The net utility of j is U j. It increases with consumption, Cj, and decreases with effort, ej,
U j = u(Cj)− V (ej), (4)
where uC > 0 and uCC < 0. The disutility of effort is convex: Ve > 0, Vee > 0. We assume








where 0 < σ ≤ 1 and v ≥ 1.
2.1 Bargaining Power and Production
The decision problems are the same for both the man and the woman who are similar in
everything except their productivity and bargaining power. Given fw, the woman maximises
her utility by choosing the level of effort as shown in (6)
Max
ew
u [fw (Y w (ew) + Y m)]− V (ew). (6)
The first-order condition given by (7) defines the woman’s supply of effort
fwuC (f
wY )Y wew − Vew = 0. (7)
Similarly, the man’s decision is given by
fmuC (f
mY )Y mew − Vem = 0. (8)
1This assumption is common in the literature. See, for example, Basu (2006), Rainer (2008) and Iyigun
and Walsh (2007), De la Croix and Vander Donckt (2010).
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The purpose of our paper is to investigate the evolutionary process which maximises
social output and therefore the survival productivity of the community which adopts partic-
ular social norms as concerns women’s position, fw. Given the effort supply decisions of m
and w, we calculate fw which would maximise the social product Y . It is easy to prove that
j′s effort increases with j′s bargaining power. However, we cannot increase the bargaining
power of the woman without decreasing that of the man. The social return on extra effort
ej depends on productivity Aj and we expect that the output maximising solution would
be to give a larger share to a more productive person. We can check this formally.
First, we define socially desirable norms.
Definition 1 Social norms, fw∗, are the most desirable in society S := (Am, Aw) if they
maximise the output Y given in production function (1) and private choice of efforts (7, 8).
The corresponding first-order conditions imply Proposition 1.






Proof. See Appendix A
Proposition 1 states that the man’s share should be larger when his relative output is
higher. On the whole, it is optimal to give a higher share to the agent who is more productive
in order to encourage a higher social output.
For further reference, it is convenient to define the relative parameters. Let
∧
e, Â, Ŷ and
















Note that Proposition 1 only presents the partial equilibrium result since the production
of the man and the woman is endogenous to their choice of effort. The effort supply equations
(7, 8) imply
fwuc (f
wY )Y we e
w








which for the constant elasticity functional forms (5) gives(
f̂
)σ
Ŷ = (ê)v+1 . (11)
Combining this with production function (1), we get relative effort and relative output as a

























> 0. When the share given to the woman increases, it has a positive
effect on her effort and a negative effect on the man’s effort, ewf > 0, e
m
f < 0.
Combining Proposition 1 with equation (13), one can derive the optimum female balance








An important observation from this result is that the relative share received by j pos-
itively depends on j’s relative productivity, df̂
∗
dÂ
> 0. When the man is given more power
(i.e. when f̂ is low), it will incentivise him to put in more effort, but it will discourage
the woman. So long as an increase in his production is higher than the decrease in the
woman’s production, the total production will be larger. We summarise these conclusions
in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 An increase in the woman’s relative productivity results in a larger socially-
optimal gender balance of power.
Proposition 2 and formula (14) provide a formal justification of the widespread assump-
tion that the relative bargaining power should be proportional to the relative productivity of
the contributers. This concept is adopted in Iyigun and Walsh (2007) and De la Croix and
Vander Donckt (2010). However, it is interesting to investigate the factors which explain
the difference in relative gender productivity. We will do so in the next section.
2.2 Production Technology
Now we will explain the difference in productivity between men and women. We model an
economy where the production process combines three sectors. The first, the natural resource
sector, uses natural resources and manual labour. This includes hunting, fishing, gathering
fruits and vegetables, building shelter, ploughing, mining etc. In the industrial era it also
includes the extraction of natural resources such as oil and minerals. The second, the physical
capital sector, produces using machinery. Finally, the human capital sector produces using
creativity and brain power, rather than physical strength. Activities which fall into the
last category would not only be the high-tech industry, financial services, research and
development, but also the effi cient organisation of daily activities, management, creative
work, entertainment and other services which require competence and skills. These activities
include child rearing, educating children and creative household production which could be
contracted out to the service industry. Some papers (including Folbre, 2008; Turchi, 1975;
De la Croix and Vander Donckt, 2010) postulate that child bearing and rearing reduce
women’s availability for productive work which is disadvantageous to their bargaining power.
However, according to their own estimation, the value of this disadvantage can be very
small and in some countries (including France, USA and Ireland) they estimate it to even
be negative. Moreover, child rearing is not a gender-specific activity and according to Sayer
et al. (2004), appropriate parenting requires both parents to spend time and effort in
bringing up their children. Furthermore, according to Del Boca et al. (2014), fathers are
almost equally productive as mothers in child rearing activities. Thus, we do not consider
child rearing activity as a gender-specific non-productive time waste, but rather as creative
human capital intensive production. In this framework, we will show that in a less developing
economy, women can specialise in child rearing because of their comparative advantages in
the human capital intensive sector. With the accumulation of human capital, we expect men
to dedicate a larger proportion of their time to child rearing and household work, which is
consistent with empirical evidence. According to Seigel (2014), the ratio of married men’s to
married women’s hours devoted to working at home rose from 0.25 to 0.54 over 1965—2003.
Sayer et al. (2004) also document that fathers increased the time spent in primary child
care activities as well as in teaching and playing activities.
We assume that female relative productivity is highest in the human capital sector. As
the economy develops, human capital accumulates and this sector becomes more important
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in production. This creates an increase in female relative productivity and, consequently, a
greater social gain from an increase in female bargaining power.
Now we will proceed with the formal model. We consider effort, ej, to be devoted to the
production in each of these sectors, namely natural resource, physical capital and human
capital, denoted by rj, lj and hj, respectively.
ej = rj + lj + hj. (15)
The total productivity of j in each given sector depends on the existing level of resources
in the whole economy as well as j’s own productivity in that particular sector. The ag-
gregate level of production factors, such as natural resources, physical capital and human
capital, are denoted by R,K and H, respectively. They indicate the existing development
in corresponding sectors. The productivity of individual j in sector s for a given level of
resources is denoted by ajs, s = r, l, h.
The total output is a consolidation of sectorial effective efforts.2 The total effective effort




















where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution.3 The aggregate effective effort increases with the
input of each sector at a diminishing rate. Moreover, the sectorial inputs are complementary
so that an increase in input in one sector would raise the productivity of input in another
sector.
2.2.1 Sectorial Labour Supply
The objective of j is to maximise own net utility U j in (4) by choosing rj, lj and hj subject
to (15) and (16). As is proven in Appendix B, the solution implies that the following share



























































Therefore, the share of effort in each sector positively depends on the share of productivity.
Not surprisingly, we find that both the man and the woman would spend more time in the
sector where his or her productivity is higher. Moreover, a higher existing level of sectorial
size (R, H, K) would positively influence the time allocated to that sector. These findings
are presented in Proposition 3.
2This production function, as in Galor and Weil (1996), relates the sectorial composition of production
to the relative productivity of men and women.
3Card and DiNardo (2002) use the same type of function for the productivity of high-skilled and low-
skilled workers to show that human capital and physical capital complement each other, making the other
more productive.
9
Proposition 3 The relative sectorial effort depends positively on the relative productivity
of that sector as well as the existing level of relative inputs.
Proposition 3 implies, ceteris paribus, that both men and women would spend more
time in the human capital sector, h, compared to resource extraction, r, when either human
capital, H, is higher or the level of natural resources, R, is lower. In Section 3, we will use
this to explain cross country economic development.
2.2.2 Sectorial Productivity and Balance of Power


























ε + (amk K)








< 0 and it gives us the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Optimal female balance of power f̂ ∗ increases with the woman’s sectorial







Proposition 4 implies that everything else equal, a country where women are more skilled
in using productive resources will have a lower gender inequality compared to a country
where women are relatively less capable.
2.2.3 Relative Gender Sectorial Productivity






âh ≥ 1 > âk > âr. (21)
Our assumptions are based on the following realities. When only natural resources
are available (K = 0, H = 0), the productivity of women is, on average, lower than the
productivity of men. This is because resource extraction requires physical strength, which
means that awr < a
m
r . If people had to survive without capital and education, it would be
reasonable to assume that men would be able to produce more than women.
When we add physical capital to natural resources, we can still assume that men can
produce relatively more, awk < a
m
k . However, the relative difference is smaller when capital
is available as compared to when it is not. Therefore, an increase in capital will reduce the
relative productivity of men.
Finally, we assume that women are at least as productive as men in the human capital
sector. When technology requires knowledge and creativity, we assume that the productivity
of women can be at least equal to that of men, awh ≥ amh . This assumption is supported




> 0, which indicates that any increase in sectorial productivity will increase total
productivity.
10
industries that are high-tech and R&D intense and that the gender wage gap becomes lower
with education.5
2.2.4 Sectorial Size and Gender Balance of Power
Gender balance of power can be affected not only by the relative productivity, but also by








ε + (amk K)





By a direct differentiation of (22), we prove the next Proposition in Appendix C.
Proposition 5 The optimal female balance of power, f̂ ∗, (1) increases with the level of
human capital H, (2) decreases with the level of natural resources, R and (3) increases with
physical capital, K when âk is suffi ciently high and H/R, âr and âh are suffi ciently low.
An important finding is that a woman’s relative productivity as well as her bargaining
power are higher if she lives in a society with a higher level of human capital. This is due












Similarly, female relative productivity is lowest in the natural resources sector. Therefore,
when the share of natural resources is higher, the man’s total productivity will be higher,




This result can partly explain Alesina et al. (2013) who showed that the communities, with
more productive land in the preindustrial period, have developed more unequal gender roles.
The role of physical capital is ambiguous. In developing countries with lower levels of
human capital, the use of machinery reduces the importance of physical strength which
reduces the relative productivity of men. When the human capital to natural resource ratio
is low, the accumulation of physical capital will give women more power. However, in a
society with a relatively high level of human capital, extra physical capital may reduce the
















5See also Machin and McNally (2005), Charles and Luoh (2003), Dollar and Gatti (1999), Hill and King
(1995), Schultz (1995, 2002), Klasen (2002), Klasen and Lamanna (2009), Knowles et al. (2002), Barro




Now that we have analysed how a representative man and woman allocate their effort in a
static model, we move on to investigate how this set up affects the production in successive
periods. We use a simple growth model to analyse this issue within a dynamic framework.
The similar dynamics can be derived if we consider either a Dynasty Model or an Overlapping
Generations Model with altruism.6 However, as the purpose of our paper is to emphasise
the role of the structural change in total production on female bargaining power, we use the
restricted version of the dynamic equation, purely for tractability and presentation.
The physical capital changes over time as in Solow (1956)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ϕYt, (26)
where δ is the rate of depreciation and ϕ is the proportion of output which is saved and
invested in capital.
Human capital accumulates according to Becker et al. (1990)






θ , H), (27)
where the investment in human capital, hjt , is chosen by j in period t. Equation (27)
assumes that human capital accumulation does not only depend on the time that the current
generation spent working in the human capital sector, hjt , but also on the current level of
knowledge and technology in the economy, Ht. Parameter ω represents the productivity of
human capital formation; θ ∈ (0, 1) captures the elasticity of human capital accumulation
with respect to its current level; and H is the minimum level of knowledge skills which
defines human society.
When it comes to natural resources, agricultural and animal husbandry can increase
or be replaced. On the other hand, excessive hunting, mining or cultivation will result in
depletion. We assume that the depletion rate is small and the amount of natural resources
is stable over time and evolves as
Rt+1 = ρRt, (28)
where ρ = 1.
3.1 Evolution of Gender Balance of Power
Following the best tradition in the social evolution theory (Frank, 1998; Bergstrom, 1995;
Alger and Weibull, 2010, 2012), we assume that social norms f̂t evolve towards the social
optimum. At time t, the relative balance of power which maximises Yt is f̂ ∗t as defined in
(22). As both physical and human capital accumulate over time, the sectorial composition of
total output changes. This will, in turn, amend the optimal f̂ ∗t towards which the evolutional
forces drive the actual social norms, f̂t.
We assume that although the gender balance of power may be far from its optimum
value, it would gradually drift towards that level. An imperfect adjustment of social norms
can explain the cultural persistence reported in Alesina et al. (2013). A slow adjustment
may also be explained by slow social learning as in Fernandez (2013). The speed of social
adaptation of the optimum norm of gender balance of power is captured by the parameter
φ ∈ (0, 1) as follows
∧
f t = (1− φ)
∧





6Esriche et al. (2004), Hauk and Saez- Marti (2002), Echevarria and Merlo (1999), de la Croix and
Vander Donckt (2010) and Fernandez (2014).
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is what maximises Yt, which means that Yt(
∧




t ). So output in each period
will be higher if φ is higher. A faster adaptation does not necessarily mean a larger share







economy with a faster adaptation will experience a higher
∧
f t. This helps us relate the speed







, then a faster adaptation of the optimal balance of power
promotes a higher rate of economic growth.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Next we work out the level to which some of the important variables converge. From











which implies that total human capital can be unlimited, lim
t→∞
Ht =∞. We can say the same
thing about physical capital Kt; however, the rate of its growth is smaller than the growth
of Ht. There is a growing literature which empirically and theoretically argues that the
more developed is a country, the larger is the share of the high-skilled sector (Barany and
Siegel 2015, Buera and Kaboski, 2012a, 2012b; Eichengreen and Gupta, 2011; Jorgenson
and Timmer, 2011). For the parameters that we use in our simulation, the human capital
sector grows much faster than the other sectors,
lim
t→∞
Kt/Ht = 0. (31)
In that case, the optimal relative balance of power f̂ ∗t converges to a power function of the
relative productivity in the human capital sector:
lim
t→∞














ε + (amk Kt)











If âh = 1, then lim
t→∞







f̂ ∗t > 1, which means that women’s social position may converge to a level which
is even higher than that of men.
Proposition 7 When lim
t→∞
Kt/Ht = 0, the optimum balance of power converges to a level
which only depends on the relative productivity of human capital; if awh T amh , then lim
t→∞
f̂ ∗t T 1.
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3.2 Economic Development and Endowment of Resources
In this section, we simulate economic development within the framework of our model. We
find that although the limit of f̂ ∗ does not depend on the original level of natural resources,
the transition does. It would be useful to do some simulations to understand the path
of the variables. We use the parameter values as in Table 1. Notice that human capital
productivity is assumed to be the same for men and women.











h β σ v ϕ θ H
0 ε ω φ
value 2 15 30 4 20 30 0.5 0.9 2 0.3 0.9 1 3 0.2 0.1
3.2.1 Relative Effort
As physical capital and human capital increase over time, there is an increase in the rela-
tive productivity of women resulting in their willingness to choose a higher level of effort.
Moreover, the model predicts that relative effort ê would be lower in countries which start
with a larger endowment of natural resources, as shown in Figure 4. Since women’s relative
productivity in the natural resource sector is lower than that of men, their relative effort is
lower in countries with larger levels of natural resources. Even without including religious
and cultural barriers which could exist in some countries, this model explains why the labour
participation rates of women are lower in countries with high levels of natural resources.
Figure 4. Evolution of Relative Effort
3.2.2 Human Capital
Figure 5. Evolution of Human Capital
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Figure 5 shows that in a country with more natural resources, human capital is accumu-
lated at a lower speed. This is quite intuitive because the comparative advantage in natural
resource extraction demotivates society from investing in human capital.
3.2.3 Production
Agents in an economy with a larger level of natural resources spend a larger proportion of
effort on resource extraction and less time on activities which develop human capital. Such
an economy starts offwith a higher income because of the low return to scarce human capital.
In an economy which is not endowed with much natural resources, agents would devote more
effort to education and accumulate human capital faster. Over time, the country with lower
natural resources would have a higher level of output because it would have accumulated a
larger amount of human capital. The simulation clearly shows this effect in Figure 6. This
result is consistent with Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), where the curse of natural resources
is empirically documented.
Figure 6. Evolution of Output.
3.2.4 Relative Productivity and Balance of Power
Economic development occurs through the accumulation of knowledge. Over time, as hu-
man capital increases, the share of production shrinks in the two other sectors. Moreover,
an individual will allocate a larger proportion of efforts to the human capital sector as it
becomes the most productive sector. Since women are as productive as their male counter-
parts in the human capital/service sector, a higher proportion of the service sector in the
production structure will lead to an increase in female relative productivity. As women’s
relative productivity rises, so does their bargaining power. Figure 7 demonstrates that rel-
ative production and balance of power increase over time and converge to equality. It also
shows that in a country with a higher level of natural resources, women have a lower relative
productivity as well as bargaining power at any point in time. This observation is consistent
with empirical evidence reported in Alesina et al. (2014) who found that a higher relative
productivity of men in pre-industrial time negatively affects gender equality even today.
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Figure 7. Evolution of Relative Output and Balance of Power
Relative output, Ŷ Woman share, fw
3.3 Premature Gender Equality and Economic Growth
We have seen that gender equality is output maximising when a country is suffi ciently
developed and that as an economy becomes more developed it also evolves towards being
a gender equal society. In less developed economies with a relatively low level of human
capital, more gender equality results in a lower social product. In this section, we analyse
what would happen to an economy if an outside force intervened to implement gender
equality.
Our simulations show that in the long run, an economy where gender equality is enforced
at an early stage of its development can outperform an economy where the gender balance
is designed to maximise social output. The reason is that in a gender-equal economy, more
resources are diverted to the accumulation of human capital and it is accumulated at a
higher rate. On the one hand, since women are less productive, incentivising their effort at
the expense of men will reduce total output, because it would discourage the more highly
productive man from producing. On the other hand, women will concentrate their effort in
the human capital sector rather than in resource extraction and therefore their empowerment
will speed up the structural changes in the economy. This will lead to a larger investment
in human capital which will grow faster. In the long run, this earlier switch to the human
capital sector will pay off and an economy with gender equality will overtake the one which
maximises social output.
Figure 8. Output Maximising fw
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To demonstrate what happens when there is premature gender equality through inter-
vention, we run the following simulation. First, we generate an economy where gender power
is designed to maximise the social output without any postponement in the rigidities in evo-
lution. The graph in Figure 8 represents female bargaining power in such an economy. It
is interesting to see that inequality persists for a significant period of time before there is a
sudden emancipation (in our simulations it occurs around period 26).
Next we simulate three economies which start from the same level of endowment and
differ only by the period of time when gender equality is introduced. In the first econ-
omy, we introduce gender equality from the beginning. We allow the second and the third
economy to develop for 10 and 20 periods, respectively, before introducing gender equal-
ity. Figure 9 shows the relative social output in those three economies as compared to an
economy which developed at its own pace without any promotion of gender equality - i.e.
the lines present the percentage difference in output and human capital between “gender
equal policy”and “output maximising policy”in the three economies. The y-axis indicates(




Figure 9. Percentage Difference in Output
We can see that a premature introduction of gender equality results in an immediate loss
of social output as compared to an output maximising path. The continuous blue line, which
represents the economy which introduced gender equality at the very beginning, shows how
it can be at a state of low output for a longer period than those which introduced gender
equality later. What is interesting to note is that the economy which introduced gender
equality first grows faster and at a larger scale in the period of emancipation, and remains
more advanced for many periods thereafter. This is because gender equality promotes a
faster accumulation of human capital.
Figure 10 depicts the relative stock of human capital for the three economies mentioned
above. The difference becomes positive immediately after the introduction of gender equality
and stays positive thereafter.
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Figure 10. Relative Stock of Human Capital with Gender Equality
An economy with gender equality may stay behind for a long time in terms of social
output. However, it always has a higher level of human capital. Eventually, since human
capital is the most productive, an economy with gender equality will outperform an economy
which maintains output maximising a gender balance of power. The gain may be realised in
the distant future and whether it is socially desirable depends on the social discount factor.
We can say that gender equality is welfare improving if the social time discount factor equals
one (Ramsey, 1928), which means that the welfare of future generations is as important as
the welfare of the current generation.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we carry out a simple empirical analysis to test the predictions of our
theoretical model. First, we estimate the variables that affect gender inequality, testing the
effect of natural resources, physical capital and human capital. Then, we perform a panel
data analysis to test the effect of gender inequality on the economy. The various data sources
and the summary statistics of the variables used for the regression analyses are presented in
Tables 4, 5 and 6 within Appendix E. There are various proxies that can be used to capture
the level of gender equality between women and men, such as labour market participation,
years of schooling, life expectancy, bank account holding etc. What we consider as gender
equality in our model goes deeper than any of these factors. This is why we decided to
use the Gender Inequality Index which encompasses several forms of gender inequalities and
seemed the most appropriate variable to represent what is in our theoretical model.7
7According to the UN Human Development Report, "GII measures gender inequalities in three important
aspects of human development– reproductive health, measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent
birth rates; empowerment, measured by proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and pro-
portion of adult females and males aged 25 years and older with at least some secondary education; and
economic status, expressed as labour market participation and measured by labour force participation rate of
female and male populations aged 15 years and older." http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-
index-gii
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4.1 Factors Affecting Gender Inequality
In order to test the predictions of the theoretical model, we carried out an ordinary least
squares regression using 92 countries which are those with the relevant data available in
the year 2014. The dependent variable is Gender Inequality Index, denoted by GII. The
explanatory variables of particular interest are (1) natural resources, captured by rent from
natural resources (oil, natural gas, coal, mineral and forest) as a percentage of GDP, (2)
physical capital, proxied by kg of oil equivalent per capita and (3) human capital, represented
by the Human Capital Index, denoted by NRpGDP , EnergypGDP , and HCI, respectively.
The general economic climate of the country is controlled by the unemployment rate, denoted
by Unemp. The natural logs are taken for these explanatory variables. The proxy for social
norms is captured by the percentage of the population following different religions in each
country. The appropriate functional form for the regression analysis, shown in (33), was
chosen by checking for serial correlation, distributions of the variables, and the Ramsey
RESET test.
GIIi = β0 + β1 lnNRpGDPi + β2(lnNRpGDP )
2
i (33)
+β3 lnEnergypGDPi + β4 lnHCIi
+β5 lnUnempi + βReligioni + ui.
The results of the OLS regression are presented in Table 2. The robust standard errors
are shown within parenthesis while *, ** and *** indicate the level of significance to be 10%,
5% and 1%, respectively. Models I and II only include the explanatory variables in which
we are interested, with Model II being better. Model III includes all control variables while
Model IV checks the robustness of the variables which are significant.
Table 2. OLS regression of factors affecting Gender Inequality Index
GII























































R2 0.7667 0.7928 0.8231 0.8059
RESET test (P > F ) 0.0258 0.0840 0.0005 0.0148
Number of observations 92 92 92 92
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The independent variables capturing the three sectors of interest, namely natural re-
sources, physical capital and human capital, show the signs predicted by the theoretical
model and are statistically significant. First, the results confirm at the 1% significance
level that the level of natural resources increases the gender inequality, in other words, has
a negative effect on gender equality. Further, the effect is even larger at higher levels of
NRpGDP . The next theoretical prediction is that physical capital (use of machinery etc.)
will increase gender equality, as will human capital. Our empirical results confirm this at
the 1% significance level by indicating that GII will be reduced when there is an increase
in both the use of energy and the human capital index and, moreover, the effect of HCI is
higher. As suggested by the theoretical model, the key to the level of gender equality is the
production function - how much the economy relies on natural resources, physical capital
and human capital.
4.2 Effect of Gender Equality on the Economy
Now that we have tested the predictions of the effect of the various sectors on gender equal-
ity, we move to the next segment. If the theoretical model is a good description of reality,
gender equality should result in economic growth. To test this, a panel data analysis is
performed using the model shown in (34), with 128 countries over the years 1995-2014 ac-
cording to the availability of relevant data. The natural log of GDP per capita, lnGDPpc,
is chosen as the dependent variable. The main explanatory variable is the natural log of
Gender Inequality Index, lnGII. We control for some variables which capture the economic
conditions and policies of the country: natural logs of unemployment rate, inflation, govern-
ment expenditure as a percentage of GDP, exports and imports as a percentage of GDP and
life expectancy, denoted by lnUnemp, ln Inflation, lnGovtpGDP , lnExp_impGDP and
lnLifeex, respectively. Finally, we have included yearly trends to control for time trends
not captured by year fixed effects. The regression included year fixed effects and country
fixed effects, while standard errors are clustered by countries.
lnGDPpcit = β0 + β1 lnGIIit + β2 (lnGII)
2
it + β3 lnUnempit (34)
+β4 ln Inflationit + β5 lnGovtpGDPit
+β6 lnExp_impGDPit + β7 lnLifeexit + β7Y ear + uit.
The results are shown in Table 3. It is clear from Model I and II that an increase in the
Gender Inequality Index has a negative effect on GDP per capita, especially on the rate
of change, at the 5% significant level. The coeffi cient of (lnGII)2it indicates that at higher
levels of gender inequality, the negative effect on GDP per capita will be even larger. This
supports the prediction of the theoretical model that gender equality will increase total
production. The signs related to the control variables are not surprising. First difference
estimation results are presented in Table 7 within Appendix F as a robustness check to
control for time trends in unobservables that are not captured by Fixed-Effects Regressions.
Furthermore, the results shown in Model III confirm the prediction that this negative effect
is stronger in developed economies. The influence of gender equality on the output of poorer
countries is positive according to Model IV , which is consistent with our model discussed in
Section 3.3 where we find that in poor economies, gender equality results in lower output.
The OECD countries were considered as developed, where the dependent variable is denoted
by lnGDPpcRich, while less developed countries are those listed by the United Nations,
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denoted by lnGDPpcPoor.8
Table 3. Panel regression of the effect of GII on GDP per capita
I II III IV


































































Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.9954 0.9954 0.9938 0.9735
Adj R2 0.9944 0.9944 0.9921 0.9649
Observations 821 821 217 161
Countries 128 128 32 26
Finally, the panel data is used to analyse how GII has evolved over time. Keeping the
countries clustered, it was found that GII was reduced as the years progressed at the 1%
significance level, as shown in Figure 11.
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This paper explains the difference in the gender balance of power across countries and across
time. We based our model on the assumption that social norms evolve towards those max-
imising economic production. We show that an increase in women’s relative productivity
will increase their bargaining power. The dynamic framework highlights the negative impact
of natural resources and the positive impact of human capital on the evolution of female
balance of power. The empirical analysis supports this prediction. The dynamic model pre-
dicts that the gender balance of power converges to equality when women are as productive
as men in human capital intensive industries.
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A. Proof of Proposition 1
The woman’s share f is chosen to maximise Y , subject to the two effort supply equations
LY = (Y m + Y w) + sw (fwuwc Y
w
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. We use that definition










































































































































































































































































































In our simple case, when all functions have constant elasticities and the functional forms







B. Proof of Proposition 3
The Lagrangian of the decision problem when choosing ew and its allocation to the three
sectors optimally by j = w is solved below.
L =
[
























−λ (−ew + [rw + lw + hw]) ,
The first-order conditions are
∂L
∂Aw
Aw = fβ (Awew)β
[
f((Awew)β + Y M)
]σ−1
− µewAw = 0;
∂L
∂ew
ew = fβ (Awew)β
[
f((Awew)β + Y M)
]σ−1
− µAwew − (ew)v+1 + λew = 0;
∂L
∂rw





ε+1 − λrw = 0; (B2)
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ε+1 − λlw = 0;
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ε+1 − λhw = 0.
Summation of the last three equations results in
µAwew = λew; λ = µAw. (B3)
Substituting this into the first-order condition, we get the following.
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If we do the same exercise for j = m, we will get the same outcome.
C. Proof of Proposition 5
According to (14) and (20)
ln f̂ ∗ =
(v + 1)β
ε (v + 1− β (σ + 1)) ln
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This is true due to the assumptions in (21) that ((amr a
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Similarly, by direct differentiation, we can prove that female bargaining power declines
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D. Proof of Proposition 6
First, we will show that dYt
dφ







































Second, from equation (26) we conclude that a physical capital investment is larger for
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v+1−β − ε is negative, which is
definitely true if ε > β
v+1−β .
E. Summary statistics
Data on GII is from http://hdr.undp.org/en/data and HCI is from
https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/. Religious representation is from
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/2010/number/all/. The
rest of the data are from the world bank (https://data.worldbank.org/).
Table 4. Description of the variables
Variable Description
GII An index using factors related to education , health , lab our market particpation and empowerm ent etc.
NRpGDP Rent9 from natural resources (o il, natural gas, coal, m ineral and forest) as a % of GDP.
EnergypGDP kg of o il equ ivalent p er cap ita .
HCI Index using years of schooling and returns to education
Unemp Percentage of tota l lab our force who are unemployed (modeled ILO estim ate).
Religion All variab les related to relig ions are the proportion of tota l p opulation in the country in that year.
GDPpc GDP per cap ita (m easured in constant 2010 US $)
Inflation Annual grow th rate of the GDP implicit deflator.
GovtpGDP All governm ent current exp enditures for purchases of goods and serv ices as a % of GDP.
Exp_impGDP Tatal exp orts and imports of goods and serv ices (m easured in constant 2010 US$) as a % of GDP.
Lifeex Life exp ectancy at b irth
9Rent is difference between the value of natural gas production at world prices and total costs of pro-
duction.
29
Table 5. Summary statistics of the variables used for the OLS analysis
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GII 127 0.3509 0.1883 0.043 0.757
NRpGDP 153 8.2951 11.1681 0.0004 54.1589
EnergypGDP 128 2634.609 3081.16 150.7341 18562.67
HCI 137 2.6308 0.6698 1.1926 3.7343
Unemp 155 8.0334 5.9322 0.198 28.03
Buddhist 159 0.443 0.1618 0 0.9669
Christian 159 0.5209 0.3714 0 0.98
Hindu 159 0.0245 0.1065 0 0.8134
Islam 159 0.2732 0.3745 0 0.9956
Otherreligion 159 0.0652 0.12180 0 0.8508
Noreligion 159 0.0794 0.1237 0 0.7575
Table 6. Summary statistics of the variables used for the Panel data analysis
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDPpc 4289 11928.47 17253.96 115.794 111968
GII 979 0.3948 0.1975 0.043 1.07547
Lifeex 4534 67.9339 9.7183 27.61 84.278
UNemp 4399 8.5664 6.2622 0.16 44.157
Inflation 4285 41.7233 530.1547 -31.5659 26762
GovtpGDP 4090 16.1772 8.1498 2.0471 163.579
Exp_impGDP 4148 84.8968 53.2101 0.021 531.7374
F. First difference estimate results




































Country fixed effects Yes Yes




There are only 399 observations across 123 countres when we carry out first difference
estimations, because GII is not available in all the years. All the signs are as expected and
this confirms that lnGIIit has a significantly negative effect on lnGDPpc.
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